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ABSTRACT
Although numerous resources are available to achieve Internet presence by
creating and publishing a web site, security and access control within the site are very
limited. The Navy's support of the IT-21 initiative embracing the Microsoft® Windows
NT® operating system (OS) provides solutions to not only restrict entry to the site, but
also to control access to content on the web page.
Work detailed in this thesis addresses the issue of security by exploring the
Windows NT OS and activating its inherent security features to protect the overall system
from intrusion and attacks from the Internet. The web pages are published using
Microsoft® Internet Information Server 4.0 (IIS) and FrontPage™ 98. Access is
controlled by issuing certificates from the resident Microsoft® certificate Server software
package or remotely by VeriSign™ OnSite service. Windows NT and IIS permit a
certificate to be mapped to a system account to further define the level of access assigned
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The Internet, or more specifically the World Wide Web multimedia portion
familiar to the majority of users, has grown in popularity as a communication tool. Its
features include a platform-independent means of conveying information, graphics,
sound, files, etc.
The Web was developed in early 1989 by researchers at the European Laboratory
for Particle Physics in Geneva, Switzerland. The goal was to create an online system that
would allow nontechnical users to share data "online" without the need for remembering
extensive commands or using complicated interfaces. Developers began designing and
creating browsers that would simplify the access methods to the information. By 1993,
these web browsers and graphic pages began to change the way users viewed the Internet
and accessed required information.
By posting information on a web page, that information becomes available to
anyone who can access that particular web page by means of its Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) through the browser interface.
The free flow of information has rapidly changed how our society does business,
researches topics of interest, and views the world in general. The availability provided by
web pages offers 24 hour access and reduces the need for dedicated communication
channels for support, updates, and required information.
The focus of this thesis is to use the availability provided by the Internet as an
advantage to monitor a remote system without the additional investment of dedicated
communications equipment. The system can be monitored and even adjusted through
links provided on a web page, thus requiring a limited amount of equipment to connect
the remote system to the Internet. Access to the web page content can be achieved in
various ways, including passwords, biometric interfaces at the user's site, and digital
certificates to name a few. This implementation limits the access of most of the web page
content to authenticated users identified by means of digital certificates.
With the introduction of the Navy's Information Technology for the 21st Century
(IT-21) concept, new implementation standards are being instituted. IT-21 calls for PC-
based tactical information network supported by Microsoft® Windows NT® servers and
clients. The push to standardize the information infrastructure stems from a desire for
improved information flow to the warfighter. The system used for this project consists of
a digital still camera connected to a personal computer (PC), with Windows NT Server
4.0 as the operating system, to broadcast the images to the world.
Currently, most Internet services at NPS are provided by UNIX platforms. The
goal of this project is to present an alternative solution using IT-21 compliant software
and hardware not only to publish and administer a Web site, but also control user access.
B. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
Chapter II provides an overview of the IT-21 concept including the proposed
standards for compliant software, hardware, and workstations. Since IT-21 calls for the
use of the Windows NT operating system (OS), Chapter III presents an in depth look at
the Windows NT OS with an emphasis on the inherent security features and the steps
required to meet Department of Defense C2 compliance. Chapter IV analyses
Microsoft® Internet Information Server 4.0 and FrontPage 98, two key software
applications necessary to publish and administer web pages in a Windows NT-based
environment. Chapter IV examines access control using digital certificates to identify a
user to the system, which also determines the amount of access granted to that individual.
Chapter VI details the specifications of all hardware used for the project. Chapter VII
states conclusions formulated through the work of this thesis and presents
recommendations for the direction of future efforts.
Appendix A provides detailed permission changes for both the registry and files
or directories for use with the Microsoft C2 Configuration Manger. Appendix B lists the




This chapter provides an overview of the Information Technology for the 21 st
Century (IT-21) concept. The minimum implementation standards for acquiring
software, hardware and workstations for the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific fleet units and
bases are presented.
B. IT-21 ORIGINS
Information superiority is the foundation of Joint Vision 2010 battlefield
dominance. Each service in the Department of Defense (DOD) has a warfighting vision
based on gaining and maintaining that information superiority. The shift in focus from
platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare throughout the military does not
require merely the acquisition of new technology. It requires a plan to change the
mindset of warfighters, to modernize and standardize the Navy's Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) infrastructure, and to improve
accurate and timely information dissemination to dispersed forces.
The IT-21 concept was originated by Admiral Archie Clemins, Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). IT-21 is a coordinated networking initiative
being implemented as a team effort between the Secretary of the Navy, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command, and the Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command. IT-21
strives to accelerate the transition from existing C4I programs to a personal computer
(PC) based tactical warfighting network. The four elements of IT-21 are shipboard
networks, commercial wideband satellite communications, shore-based infrastructure,
and tactical and nontactical applications.
Guidance for absolute minimum standards and guidelines is provided by the Joint
Technical Architecture (JTA) and Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating
Environment (DII COE). The office of the Department of the Navy Chief Information
Officer has published the Information Technology Standards Guidance version 98-1.1 to
provide guidance for standardizing information systems. The initial release of this
document can be found at [http://www.doncio.navy.mil/itsgpublic]. The ultimate goal is
to link communication between all U.S. forces and eventually link allies as well. The
emphasis is on exchanging classified and unclassified, tactical and non-tactical
information from a desktop computer.
In an era of continuing force reductions and budget cuts, IT-2 1 provides adaptable
hardware and software implementation standards for fleet information systems. This
approach adopts industry standards and advocates the use of commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) technology in a client-server environment allowing the user to pull just what
information is needed in a seamless manner [Ref. 1]. The fleets cannot afford to continue
support for diverse operating systems (OS) that require separate training, operational
procedures, troubleshooting requirements for interoperability between operating systems,
and maintenance in a time of shrinking defense budgets.
The goal of driving all information gathering resources to a single PC allows
multiple functions on a single workstation instead of multiple workstations dedicated to
single function. This will reduce the number of workstations required, reduce the
shipboard space needed, and increase productivity of the individual warfighter.
C. IT-21 STANDARDS
IT-21 standards represent current market technology in software, hardware, and
workstation capabilities. The standards are dynamic in nature, and will adapt to keep
pace with commercial trends.
1. Software Standards
Table 2.1 lists the minimum software standards introduced in a Message from
CINCPACFLT in Reference 2, which will be updated periodically. All non-standard OS
and electronic mail (e-mail) products will be replaced no later than December 1999 in
anticipation of the inactivation of the current DOD messaging system (AUTODIN).
There will be exceptions made in rare cases where there is an overwhelming reason to use
a high-end UNIX workstation, such as application servers. Windows NT is the preferred
operating system. When Windows NT is not practical, operating systems chosen must be
standards based, primarily those that comply with X/Open CAE and Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers' (IEEE's) POSIX specifications. The guidance for personal
workstations is to use operating systems that comply with Win 32 standard interfaces for
long-term usability.
All relational databases capable of supporting World Wide Web (WWW)
technology in accordance with COE will be used to support data requirements and
application development. Relational database management systems (RDBMS) software
that support web technology include Oracle®, Sybase® SQL Server™, Microsoft® SQL
Server, and Microsoft® Access.
Software Category IT-21 Minimum Standard
Operating System Microsoft® Windows NT® 4.0/5.0 Server
Microsoft® Windows NT® 4.0/5.0 Workstation
Electronic Mail Microsoft® Exchange 5.0
Office Software Microsoft® Office 97 Professional
Anti-Virus Protection IBM® Antivirus
Additional Software Microsoft® BackOffice™ Client, Microsoft® Outlook
97, Microsoft® Image Composer
Table 2.1 IT-21 Minimum Software Standards [Ref. 2]
2. Hardware Standards
Table 2.2 lists the minimum network hardware standards, and Table 2.3 on the
following page lists the minimum workstation standards introduced in Reference 2.
Since software requirements drive hardware standards, these standards will be upgraded
in response to commercial trends and new technological advances.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In general, IT-21 is an effort to improve the flow of information by concentrating
funding and training on industry-standard software, hardware, and workstations. The
emphasis is on bringing the power of timely, accurate information to the warfighter in the
field or afloat. The minimum standards for acquiring software, hardware and
workstations set a foundation for future growth that ensures interoperability between
Navy information systems. It is the proposed IT-21 standards for workstations and
software that determined the type of hardware purchased for this project, the software
products chosen for implementation of the Web site, and the type of access control used.
Hardware Category IT-21 Minimum Standard
Afloat LANs ATM Fiber backbone, 1 00 Mbps (Fast Ethernet) to
PC
Ashore Tactical and Headquarters
Command Centers








Capable of at least OC-3 (155 Mbps)
Table 2.2 IT-21 Minimum Hardware Standards [Ref. 2]
Workstation Type IT-21 Minimum Standard
PC Capabilities 200 MHz Pentium Pro CPU
64 MB EDO RAM
3.0 GB Hard Disk Drive
3.5 inch Floppy Disk Drive
8X IDE CD-ROM
Dual PCMCIA/PC Card Reader
PCI Video Card with 2 MB RAM
17 inch Monitor (1280 x 1024)
Pointing Device (Trackball or Mouse)
Soundblaster (Compatible) Audio Card with
Speakers
Keyboard
CPU Compatible with 100 Mbps Fast Ethernet NIC
Laptop Capabilities Dual 150 MHz Pentium CPU
32 MB EDO RAM
2.1 GB EIDE Hard Disk Drive
6X Internal CD-ROM
PCMCIA Slots
Modem or Network Interface Card (NIC)
12 inch SVGA Active Matrix Color Display
Smart Lithium Battery
Table 2.3 IT-21 Minimum Workstation Standards [Ref. 2]
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III. WINDOWS NT SERVER
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter provides background information regarding the development of
Microsoft® Windows NT® and a look at the design goals and implementation of a
Windows NT Server. The security aspects of Windows NT are presented as they pertain
to the security subsystem, the use of service packs to correct deficiencies and add
enhancements, a brief overview of the U.S. government C2 requirements, and how
Windows NT fulfills the requirements with the implementation of the C2 Configuration
Manager and some additional modifications.
B. HISTORY OF WINDOWS NT
The Microsoft Windows NT development team was formed in 1989. The team
mission was defined as:
To design and build a personal computer operating system that would
meet the current and future operating system needs of the PC platform
[Ref. 3].
To accomplish the mission, the following market requirements were identified:
• To provide easy portability to other 32-bit architectures
• To provide scalability and multiprocessing support
• To support distributed computing, allowing multiple computers to share
resources
• To support the application programming interfaces (APIs) required by the
Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX (POSIX)
• To provide U.S. Government Class 2 (C2) security features, and to provide a
path to Class B 1 and beyond
11
Microsoft's design team prioritized goals, including robustness, extensibility and
maintainability, portability, performance, POSIX compliance, and government certifiable
C2 security. For robustness, the operating system should actively protect itself from
internal malfunction and external damage. It must respond predictably to software and
hardware errors. The NT system must be straightforward in its architecture and coding
practices, and interfaces and behavior be well specified. For extensibility and
maintainability, the OS must be designed to grow and adapt to future needs of Microsoft
and the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
The system must accommodate changes and additions to the API sets supported.
In addition, the APIs should not employ flags or other devices to drastically alter
functionality. By using subsystems to implement major portions of the system, Windows
NT can isolate and control dependencies. [Ref. 3]
The system architecture must be portable to a number of other platforms with
minimal recoding. The design must include algorithms and data structures that produce a
high level of performance and provide the flexibility needed to achieve the performance
goals. Finally, the goal for the POSIX standard calls for operating system vendors to
implement UNIX-style interfaces so that applications can be moved easily from one
system to another. U.S. government security guidelines specify certain protections such
as auditing capabilities, access detection, per-user resource quotas, and resource
protection. [Ref. 3]
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C. WINDOWS NT DESIGN
The Windows NT system design consists of:
• executive
• internal processes
• a set of non-privileged servers called protected subsystems
The executive runs in kernel—or privileged processor—mode providing system
services. The executive serves as the only entry point into the system. The protected
subsystems run in non-privileged—or user—mode outside of the executive. A protected
subsystem executes in user mode as a regular process. The subsystem may have
extended privileges as compared to an application, but it is not considered a part of the
executive and cannot bypass the system security architecture or corrupt the system in any
other way. Subsystems communicate with their clients and each other using local
procedure calls (LPCs).
The NT executive includes a set of system service components—the Object
Manager, the Security Reference Monitor, the Process Manager, and so forth—which are
exposed through a set of system services similar to APIs. The executive performs some
internal routines, but its primary responsibility is taking an existing process thread from a
requesting subsystem or application, validate that the thread should be processed, execute
it, and then return control of the thread to the requestor. Figure 3 . 1 displays the Windows
NT 4.0 operating system basic architecture [Ref. 3]
The division of the OS into kernel-mode system services and subsystems adds a
layer of validation to ensure improper application behavior will not crash the operating
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system. In addition, each service is required to capture and probe the values of any
arguments upon which it will operate to ensure that the caller or one of its threads cannot
dynamically alter the value or delete the memory in which it is contained. Most
arguments do not need explicit capture if they are passed in registers and arguments
passed in memory are probed and captured by the system service dispatcher as necessary.
Address-space layout includes both user address space and system address space. In
order to maintain separation, a 64 KB boundary is included which is inaccessible to both
user and system modes. [Ref. 3].
Most ofNT's code is written in C language, but some of its modules are written in
C++ and Assembly. All the system's code dependent upon the hardware is isolated into a
library called the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL). The HAL enables Windows NT to
be very portable, allowing adaptation to both RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer)
and CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computer) hardware platforms. Since it is a true 32-
bit multitasking OS, NT 4.0 allows you to run programs totally independent from each
other in their own separate memory space [Ref. 4]
Windows NT Server support of communication and internetworking features
includes Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for distributed applications;
Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) to create secure private intranets over the
Internet; and Multiprotocol Router to provide Local Area Network (LAN) to LAN
routing of TCP/IP, IPX, and AppleTalk protocols.
14
D. SECURITY
This section will outline the features of Windows NT 4.0 security subsystem and




































Figure 3.1 Windows NT 4.0 Basic Architecture [Ref. 3]
1. Security Subsystem
The NT security architecture provides a secure means to control all access to
objects. The NT OS represents virtually everything as an object including memory
devices, system processes, threads, and windows appearing on the desktop. An object is
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a self-contained entity maintaining its own data and functions required to manipulate the
data, including who or what processes can access that data or resources. Access to
objects is regulated by the security subsystem to ensure access is only granted with proper
authorization. An administrator is able to assign permissions to users or groups to grant
or deny access to specific objects.
The Logon Process protected subsystem, Security protected subsystem, and the
Security Reference Monitor (SRM) form the security model for Windows NT. The
security subsystem is comprised of the Local Security Authority (LSA) and Security
Account Manager (SAM) which work in conjunction with the Security Reference
Monitor and the logon processes.
a. Security Identifiers
A unique Security Identifier (SID) instead of a username identifies
Windows NT users to the system. The security subsystem generates a SID when the
account is created using a proprietary hashing function. The hashing function to create
the SID is based on the current system time, the amount of user-mode execution time for
the current process, and the computer name or domain name. A SID cannot be reused,
even if the same user account name is reinstated. In the case where an account is
removed and then recreated, a new SID will be created. If the user belongs to a group, a
unique SID for that group will be created while the user maintains his or her own unique
SID. [Ref. 5]
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b. Local SecurityA uthority (LSA)
The Local Security Authority serves as the central component of the
security subsystem with the responsibility of generating access tokens, managing security
policies on the local computer, and facilitates user logon authentication. [Ref. 5] As soon
as the SAM verifies the password against the user database, the LSA creates an access
token for that user that includes the unique SID and user privileges. The user, and every
process he or she starts, is associated with that access token. When a user tries to access a
secured object, his or her access token is checked against the object's ACL. Whenever a
user wishes to do something that is associated with a privilege, the security subsystem
examines the access token.
c. Security Account Manager (SAM)
The Security Account Manager maintains the security accounts database
of all local user and group account information, including domain accounts when in NT
Server mode. The SAM verifies and identifies users during the logon process by
comparing user-entered data to authentication data—such as passwords—from its
database. The SAM provides the SID when requested by the LSA at logon for user
validation. [Ref. 4]
d. Security Reference Monitor (SRM)
Serving as the enforcer for the security subsystem, the Security Reference
Monitor prevents direct access to objects by users and processes lacking proper
permissions. The SRM is fixed in kernel mode and provides services to check user
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access rights at each request. Information regarding success or failure of user access
attempts and any necessary audit messages are sent to the LSA to be logged. The SRM
responds to both user and system authorization requests. [Ref. 5]
e. Access Control List (ACL)
An Access Control List is a directory of the sets of attributes associated
with an object and the users—identified by SIDs—who may execute those attributes.
The list of attributes and users is represented in a structure known as an Access Control
Entry (ACE). Each ACE records access or auditing permissions to an object for a single
user or group. For each object, there exist two associated ACLs. The Discretionary ACL
represents rights that may be assigned by designated users and the System ACL, which is
set by system security policies. [Ref. 5]
2. Service Packs
A service pack is a periodic update to the operating system that contains fixes to
problems uncovered by users and enhancements to the OS. Since its introduction until
August 1998, Microsoft has released three service packs for Windows NT 4.0.
Interim updates addressing specific problems are called hotfixes. Service packs
are cumulative in that they include all fixes from previous service packs and new
hotfixes. Hotfixes shall be installed in ascending order of date/time stamp on the
executables, as some hotfixes will write over files modified by other hotfixes. A
complete list of available service packs and hotfixes is available at
ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/fixes/usa/nt40/hotfixes-postSP3. Any
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time new software or hardware components are installed, Service Pack 3 and current
hotfixes must be reapplied. [Ref. 5]
3. C2 Security Measures
The original Windows NT design goal envisioned an OS capable of Class 2 (C2)
level of trust according to the Department of Defense. In August 1995, the C2 rating was
granted for Windows NT version 3.5 under the following conditions:
• U.S. Service Pack 3 for Windows NT 3.5 installed
• Server in a stand-alone configuration
• No network services enabled [Ref. 6]
In addition, Windows NT is under evaluation for its networking component of a
secure system in compliance with the NCSC's "Red Book"—an interpretation of the
Orange Book applied to network security. [Ref. 7] The UK Information Technology
Security Evaluation and Certification (ITSEC) has given Windows NT an FC2/E3
rating—the equivalent of the C2 Red Book evaluation in the United States. [Ref. 4] This
does not mean that Windows NT is C2 certified; no operating system is ever C2 certified.
Certification applies to a particular installation, including hardware, software, and the
system environment.
a. Definition ofC2
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) is a division of the
National Security Agency and Department of Defense. Under presidential directive,
NCSC is responsible for establishing policy and procedures for securing information
valuable to the U.S. government. In order to help formalize the process of providing
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adequate trust and assurance, the NCSC published a series of computer security guides
detailing the requirements for various levels of trust in information systems.
Theses security guides are often referred to as the "Rainbow Series" after
the colors used for the covers of the guides. The most popular book, originally titled
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), is well known as the "Orange
Book" due to the original color of its cover. First issued in 1983 and updated in
December 1985, the TCSEC establishes a basis for evaluating operating system security.
It has also been issued as a DOD standard, DOD 5200.28-STD. [Ref. 8]
C2-level security is referred to as Controlled Access Protection. [Ref. 9]
Features of C2 systems include the accountability of users, discretionary controls,
auditing, protect against resource (object) reuse, prevention of external tampering with
system files in memory or on disk.
The operating system is required to clearly identify each individual user in
order to distinguish between actions of different users. NT usually accomplishes this
through the mandatory logon process using password controls.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is an access policy that restricts
access to system objects—files, directories, and devices—based on the identity of a user
or a group. DAC allows the owner or creator of an object to define access permissions to
an object and the type of access allowed. A form of DAC uses ACLs to limit access to a
resource to the degree of including or excluding single users. Windows NT fulfills this
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requirement through its object access methodology of user and system permissions and
ACLs [Ref. 5].
The operating system must track and record security-related events of all
users in the system. This audit trail must be protected from modification or unauthorized
access. Administrators on a Windows NT system are able to audit user and system events
through the LSA logging process and by limiting access to the security log to only
administrators. [Ref. 8]
Object reuse requirements protect files, memory, and other objects in a
trusted system from being accessed accidentally by unauthorized users. The OS ordinary
access control features determine appropriate access to objects assigned to specific users.
Object reuse requirements address what happens when these objects are reassigned.
These requirements must ensure the object being assigned, allocated or reallocated does
not contain data left over from previous users. [Ref. 9] Windows NT meets this criterion
by clearing memory upon allocation to a process, removing pointers to a resource
immediately after it is freed by the process, and disallowing the recovery of information
contained in disk clusters that have been freed by other users.
Finally, the OS must be protected against external tampering with system
files in memory or on disk. Windows NT enforces this requirement through memory and
disk space barriers such as separation of user memory space and system memory space
and the use of ACLs for memory and disk objects.
21
Figure 3.2 provides a graphical representation of requirements for TCSEC
evaluation.
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria Summary Chart
D CI C2 Bl B2 B3 Al
Security Policy
Discretionary Access Control <8> <8> => => ® ==>
Object Reuse <8> => => => =>
Labels <8> <8> => =>
Label Integrity <8> => => =>
Exportation of Labeled Information <8> => => =>
Labeling Human Readable Output <8> => => =>
Mandatory Access Control <8> (8> => =>
Subject Sensitivity Labels <8> => =>
Device Labels <8> => =>
Accountability
Identification and Authentication ® <8> <8> => => =>
Audit <8> <8> <8) (8) =>
Trusted Path <8) (8) =>
Assurance
System Architecture <8> <8> <8> <8> <8) =>
System Integrity ® => => => => =>
Security Testing <8> <8> <8> (8) <8> (8)
Design Specification and Verification <8> ® <8) (8>
Covert Channel Analysis <8) <8) <8)
Trusted Facility Management <8> ® =>
Configuration Management <8> => (8>
Trusted Recovery (8) =>
Trusted Distribution <8>
Documentation
Security Features User's Guide <g> => => => => =>
Trusted Facility Manual ® <8> (8) <8> (8) =>
Test Documentation <8> => => <8> => (8>
Design Documentation <g> => ® ® <8> <8>
<8> New or enhanced requirements for this class
=> No additional requirements for this class
(blank) No requirements for this class
Figure 3.2 TCSEC Evaluation Requirements [After Ref. 9]
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b. Microsoft C2 Configuration Manger
The default Windows NT 4.0 installation does not provide adequate
security to be considered C2 compliant, even with Service Pack 3 and all recommended
post service pack fixes installed. Additionally, any NT system connected to any type of
network will not be considered C2 compliant. An NT 4.0 system can be manually
configured for C2 compliance; however, the Microsoft® Windows NT® Server Resource
Kit includes useful administration tools such as the C2 Configuration Manager to
automate the process of configuring the OS.
The C2 Configuration Manger provides a graphical representation to
indicate the current state of each required and recommended security feature. Figure 3.3
displays the configuration interface, which represents a system configured to be C2
compliant except for the networking services.
Dark red padlocks indicate items that are required for C2 compliance.
Light blue padlocks indicate recommended items that are not required for C2 compliance.
A closed padlock indicates an item is secured; in the case of a red padlock, the item is
secured to be C2 compliant. An open padlock is a feature that has not been secured and
is a possible security risk. A question mark indicates the C2 Configuration Manager
could not determine the settings. A brief description follows of the system changes
effected by each feature when selected for C2 compliance.
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C2 Configuration Manager HHE3






£ File Systems All volumes use the NTFS File System
a OS Configuration The Operating System options are C2.
a OS/2 Subsystem OS/2 Subsystem is not installed.
a Posix Subsystem Posix Subsystem is not installed.
k Security Log The Security Log is configured to not overwrite events.
% Halt on Audit Failure The System will halt when the Security Log is full.
a Display Logon Message A Logon Message has been defined and will be displayed.
a Last Username Display The previous username will not be displayed at logon.
a Shutdown Button The shutdown button is not displayed on the logon dialog.
a Password Length The minimum password length is S characters.
a Guest Account No Guest user account was found on the system.
£ Networking One or more network services are installed on the system.
a Drive Letters & Printers Only Administrators may assign Drive Letters and Printers.
a Removable Media Drives The CD-ROM and Floppy Drives will be allocated at logon.
a Registry Security The system's Registry ACL's comply to the C2 Requirements.
a File System Security File system security complies to C2 Requirements.
i?* Other Security Items Unable to read the current status of this item.
Figure 3.3 C2 Configuration Manager Graphical Interface [Ref. 10]
"Convert all File Systems to NTFS" will convert all disk volumes to the
NT File System (NTFS). Under Windows NT, only NTFS supports DAC to the files and
directories for secure access to the files. The File Allocation Table (FAT) used for file
system indexing until the introduction of Windows 95 lacks access controls for
permissions at the file level. FAT cannot be used for memory volumes greater than 2
GB. In addition, NTFS allows for auditing system events, file compression, and supports
journaling, which logs all system writes to undo failed writing operations with minimal
file corruption.
"OS Configuration" sets the boot selection timeout to zero. To be C2
compliant, Windows NT must be the only operating system on the computer. With the
boot.ini timeout set to zero, Windows NT will be the default OS.
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"OS/2 Subsystem" removes the files OS2.exe and OS2SS.exe for the OS/2
subsystem. For C2 configuration, Windows NT must be the only OS on the computer.
Although the executable files have been removed, the registry keys have not been
removed.
"Posix Subsystem" removes the files PSXSS.exe for the POSIX
subsystem. For C2 configuration, Windows NT must be the only OS on the computer.
Although the executable files have been removed, the registry keys have not been
removed.
"Security Log," when secured, requires that the security logs never
overwrite events, despite the age of the events. This ensures that the security logs must
be cleared manually by the administrator on a regular basis.
"Halt on Audit" forces the system to halt if events cannot be written to the
security log due to lack of available memory for the log. If the system halts due to a full
security log, an administrator must restart the system and clear the log. Failure to clear
the security log on a regular basis could result in denial of service.
"Display Logon Message" is not a C2 requirement; however, it is
recommended that systems display a warning message before logon to indicate the
private nature of the system. The Navy uses a standard warning banner that can be
downloaded from the United States Navy Information Security (INFOSEC) Web Site
Server at [http://infosec.nosc.mil/infosec.html]. This warning banner informs users that
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their actions can be monitored and they can be held legally liable for unauthorized use of
system resources.
"Last Username Display" is not required for C2, but it is recommended
that the NT default state allowing the previous username displayed on the logon window
be changed. This will ensure that any user is unable to determine the previous user of the
system in order to exploit the system.
"Shutdown Button" removes the option of shutting down the system from
the logon window without logging on a Windows NT workstation. Disabling the feature
is not a requirement for C2, but it permits only the administrators to determine which
users are authorized to perform system shutdowns.
"Password Length" changes the password options to prohibit blank
passwords. The C2 Configuration Manager sets the default minimum password length to
six characters, but can be set to any number of characters appropriate for the security of
the system.
"Guest Account" disables the default Guest account on the system. In
Windows NT 4.0, the Guest account is disabled by default. Users must provide a valid
username and password or other acceptable identification to gain access to the system.
"Networking" disables all network services and capabilities from the
computer. The C2 configuration requires that all network services be removed for
compliance.
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"Drive Letters & Printers" may be assigned by any user by default. This
feature is not required for C2, but it is recommended that only Administrators be allowed
to assign these resources. The C2 Configuration Manager will assign these tasks to the
Administrators Group when the Secure button is selected.
"Removable Media Drives" will only allow authorized interactive users to
access files on floppy or CD-ROM drives. These drives are allocated to a user as part of
the interactive logon process and deallocated when the user logs off.
"Registry Security" allows the C2 Configuration Manager to make
changes to several registry keys; however, it does not secure the registry. The "Guide to
Implementing Windows NT® in Secure Network Environments" [Ref. 5] includes a
modified C2regacl.inf file in accordance with the guide. Each registry can also be
modified manually applying the permission changes in Appendix A. Following changes
to the registry, the registry editor should be set to "read-only" mode to prevent tampering.
The system should be restarted twice, and a new Emergency Repair Disk (ERD) should
be created to backup the recent registry changes.
"File System Security" allows the C2 Configuration Manager to make
changes to file and directory permissions. The "Guide to Implementing Windows NT®
in Secure Network Environments" [Ref. 5] includes a modified C2ntfacl.inf file in
accordance with the guide. Appendix A contains a list of all recommended file and
directory permissions that are changed by the C2 Configuration Manager by
implementing the modified C2ntfacl.inf file from the "Secure Windows NT Installation
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and Configuration Guide" [Ref. 11]. In addition, the DOS and os2 directories should be
removed from the %SystemRoot%\system32 directory as well as the files: os2.exe,
os2ss.exe, os2srv.exe, psxss.exe, posix.exe, and psxdll.dll.
Even a Windows NT 4.0 C2 configured system is still vulnerable to
exploitation. Further steps are required. Figure 3.4 lists additional C2 requirements and
other security considerations under "Other Security Items".
C2Config — Other Security Items
The items listed below cannot be detected by C2Config but
are required for a system that conforms to C2 Level Security.
Refer to the Windows NT C2 Security System Administrator's
Guide for additional detail on these settings.
Power-On Password
Refer to the system's setup and installation documentation for
information on setting the system power on password
Secure System Partition (RISC Systems Only)
Use the Disk Administrator to secure the system partjon. This
item only apples to RISC Systems.
Change User Manager Program Icon
If you are setttig up a Windows NT Server, then the User
Manager For Domains icon must be replaced with the User
Manager program icon.
Restrict Use of User Rights
The User Rights of the accounts on the system must be





Figure 3.4 Additional Recommended Security Items [Ref. 10]
c. Instituting Account Policy
User account policies are used by the system to define password attributes
and account lockout behavior. The Windows NT default account policies do not provide
adequate security controls within a secure environment. The Microsoft® User Manager
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for Domains provides an Account Policy dialog box divided into Password Restrictions





r Maximum Password Age
j
C Password Never Expires
j
<* Expires In 90 |j Days
- Minimum Password Age
C Allow Changes Immediately
(* ADow Changes In jl a Days
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-
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ff" At Least 12 Characters
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C Do Not Keep Password History
(* Remembeil 24 jJ3 Passwords
f No account lockout
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— t* Account lockout









|7 Forcibly disconnect remote users from server when bgon hours expire




Figure 3.5 Account Policy Dialog Box [Ref. 12]
On Windows NT 4.0, strong password filtering can be used to enhance the
account policy. Service Pack 3 includes a Dynamic Link Library file, passfilt.dll, which
enforces strong password requirements for all users. Passfilt.dll should be used in place
of fpnwclnt.dll unless it is essential for foreign account database synchronization.
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Passfilt.dll implements a policy requiring passwords to be at least six (6) characters long,
may not contain the user name or any part of the user's full name, and must contain
characters from at least three of the following classes:
• English upper case letters (A, B, C, . . .Z)
• English lower case letters (a, b, c, . . .z)
• Westernized Arabic numerals (0, 1,2, . . .9)
• Non-alphanumeric (special characters such as punctuation marks) [Ref 13]
d. Establishing User Rights
User rights define the allowable actions of users on a system in addition to
the built-in allowable actions. The Windows NT default user rights do not provide
adequate security controls within a secure environment. The Microsoft® User Manager
for Domains provides a User Rights Policy dialog box to allow administration of standard
and advanced user rights to strengthen the security of the Windows NT system. Both the
"Guide to Implementing Windows NT® in Secure Network Environments" [Ref. 5] and
"Securing Microsoft Windows NT Installation" [Ref. 7] provide detailed explanations of
standard and advanced user rights options and include recommendations for changes
depending upon the system configuration. "Securing Microsoft Windows NT
Installation" [Ref. 7] user rights recommendations are located in Appendix B.
e. Auditing
The auditing feature of Windows NT allows administrators to track user
accesses or modifications to files or directories. The audit log can be reviewed using the
Event Viewer, which identifies potential security threats to the system. Audit logs must
be archived and cleared on a regular basis to avoid denial of service due to memory
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depletion. The permissions on a directory created for storing the archived logs must be
changed to allow access by only administrators.
As an additional security measure, the archived event logs should be
backed up, or permanently removed from the hard drive, to a data tape and physically
secured. Figure 3.6 represents the recommended settings for an audit policy and Figure
3.7 displays the option for directory auditing.
Audit Policy
Domain: G020_TEST_LAB
C Do Not Audit
OK
Cancel
»* Auaw i nese t vents:
Success Failure
Logon and Logoff F F
File and Object Access r W
Use of User Rights r r
User and Group Management R F
Security Policy Changes p W
Restart. Shutdown, and System w p]
Process Tracking r r
Help
Figure 3.6 Recommended Audit Policy [Ref. 12]
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provides the background information required to understand the
development of Microsoft® Windows NT® from the beginning design goals to the
current implementation of Windows NT Server 4.0. The emphasis of this section is to
first secure the platform before adding the needed software. The security features of
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Windows NT are explained as they pertain to the interactions of the security subsystem
and the use of service packs to correct deficiencies and add enhancements. A brief
overview of the U.S. government C2 requirements is included as well as an examination
of how Windows NT measures up to the requirements with the use of the C2
Configuration Manager and some additional modifications.
Directory Auditing
Directory: C:\
T~ Replace Auditing on Subdirectories
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This chapter focuses on the various software applications utilized throughout this
project. The chapter begins by introducing the Microsoft® Internet Information Server
4.0 (IIS) and its integration with Windows NT to provide Internet services. Next,
Microsoft® FrontPage® 98 is discussed.
B. MICROSOFT INTERNET INFORMATION SERVER
Microsoft Internet Information Server 4.0 is designed to enhance the World Wide
Web capabilities of Windows NT Server 4.0 operating system. IIS 4.0 is available in the
Windows NT 4.0 Option Pack, which does not usually come packaged with NT Server
4.0. IIS is designed for users who wish to have Web presence, whether a small business
or an Internet Service Provider (ISP).
In order to provide support for Internet publishing, IIS consists of many
components including transport services, client applications, administrative tools,
database and applications connectivity to list a few. The major components comprising
IIS 4.0 are:
World Wide Web Service







The tight integration between Windows NT Server and IIS affords the ability to
share applications and interfaces with NT services as well as utilizing administration
tools. [Ref. 14] For example, IIS uses the same security accounts manager (SAM) as
Windows NT Server to maintain users and groups to prevent multiple sets of network and
Web site users. Also, IIS supports the Internet Server application programming interface
(ISAPI) that is a platform and API allowing preprocessing and postprocessing of data
stored on IIS. [Ref. 15]
Virtual directories are another highlight in IIS. Web administrators can assign
virtual directories to distribute the physical storage of published information from
multiple servers on the network to appear as a single directory structure to external clients
Graphical HTML editing can be accomplished without HTML programming
knowledge by using new wizards and templates. Developers can also use languages with




provides a quick and efficient means for rapid
application development. Java Virtual Machine is integrated to provide a reliable
environment for running Java components on the server with Active Server Pages.
Information may be published to the Web quickly and easily using a Web browser or the
Web publishing wizard.
1. System Requirements
IIS 4.0 is designed for use with Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 with Service
Pack 3 installed. Intel-based systems are recommended to have at least 90 MHz Pentium
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processor, 32 to 64 MB RAM, and 200 MB hard disk space. DEC Alpha-based systems
are recommended to have a 200 MHz processor, 64 MB RAM, and 200 MB hard disk
space. Also, Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.01 is recommended for browsing capabilities.
2. World Wide Web Service
The WWW service is the heart of IIS. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the
application-level protocol used by the Web. IIS WWW Service performs the hypertext
document publishing function for the Web server. It is powerful enough to host multiple
Web sites on a single IP address with Browser-Neutral Host Header Support.
Traditionally, each Web site would need to be hosted by its own installation of the Web
service requiring the allocation of more server resources for redundant processes. This
feature is referred to as Virtual Server support or Multi-Homing. The server can be
configured to support multiple TCP/IP addresses.
3. FTP and Gopher Services
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) services allow users to transfer files between the FTP
server and a client on a TCP/IP network. FTP offers the ability to copy files from as well
as place files on the server. Not every site on the Internet is a graphical Web page and
offers the ease of download scripts activated by clicking on an icon. FTP services allow
access to reports, graphics, multimedia, and other information on Web pages, in data
repositories, and archives that may or may not be published on the Web. Both DOS and
Unix-style directory listings are supported. [Ref. 14]
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Gopher is the name of a protocol used to search for and retrieve files from gopher
servers on the Internet. The gopher service functions similar to FTP, but provides a
menu-based user interface and allows a user to create hypertext links to other computers
or services, annotate files and directories, and create custom menus. It is also referred to
as a distributed document delivery system.
4. Internet Service Manager
Internet Service Manager (ISM) is run on the Windows NT Server or can be run
in HTML format from a browser that supports frames and JavaScript for remote
administration. The administration tool communicates by remote procedure calls (RPCs)
that can be used either locally or remotely by any protocol that supports RPCs. The ISM
for IIS 4.0 is implemented as a snap-in for the Microsoft Management Console (MMC).
MMC is a common management console, which provides a consistent framework that
can be used for all network administration programs. This framework integrates into a
single console the tools, information, and views of the network required to perform an
administrative task. The administrator can then use a console to manage the network, or
provide a console to others to perform an administrative task. MMC does not by itself
actually administer any part of the network, but displays consoles that host programs
called snap-ins. The snap-ins, such as Internet Service Manger, User Manager and Key
Manager, can be used to administer parts of the network from a single console.
Figure 4. 1 displays a sample console for the Microsoft Management Console.
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Figure 4.1 Microsoft Management Console
In addition, Bandwidth Throttling can be instituted to allocate network bandwidth
for each Web site. Bandwidth Throttling will limit the amount of information that can be
sent from the server at any one time. This ability offers the distribution of bandwidth
among all services that share the server bandwidth access to resources. Therefore, one
single Web page can not hoard all the bandwidth.
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5. Security
User accounts and passwords must be protected, especially if the Internet server is
compromised. User confidentiality can be protected by storing security information in an
encrypted database on or off the server through an administrative domain structure.
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) component provides a security scheme for bulk-
encrypting data between the server and its clients. In addition, administrators can limit
the security context assigned to anonymous users in order to exercise control over the
degree the server is exposed when connected to the Internet. Anonymous Internet logon
permissions can be specified down to the file level.
a. Secure Communication
SSL is a public-key-based security protocol, introduced by Netscape,
between the TCP and application layer (HTTP). The Microsoft equivalent technology is
Private Communications Technology (PCT) and is compatible with SSL. For simplicity,
all secure channels will be referred to as SSL.
SSL is application protocol independent in order to provide privacy and
reliability between two communicating applications. The SSL Record Protocol—the
lowest level—is layered on top of a reliable transport such as TCP. The Record Protocol
is used for encapsulation of various higher level protocols. An example of an
encapsulated protocol is the SSL Handshake Protocol that allows a server and client to
authenticate each other, negotiate an encryption algorithm, and exchange cryptographic
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keys before the application protocol begins to send to receive data. A higher level
protocol can layer on top of the SSL Protocol transparently.
In order to take advantage of the security offered by SSL, the client needs
to connect using SSL. This requires using HTTP with privacy (HTTPS) identifier in the
URL, such as: [https://pcgkl4.ece.nps.navy.mil]. An initial handshake between server
and client will define a secret key for the session to enable encrypted communications.
Private key cryptography, such as DES or RC4, is used for data encryption. The client's
identity can be authenticated using public key cryptography. Message transport under
SSL includes a message integrity check. Web server performance will degrade due to the
additional encryption; therefore, information that does not require a secure channel—such
as image files—should remain as normal HTTP. There are additional encryption features
in the Windows NT security model available to IIS.
b. File Access
Every potential user need not be recognized by the system in order to view
Web page content. All requests for pages from IIS will first be accessed with IIS
Anonymous User privileges. The Anonymous User is setup as a default when IIS is
installed and creates a Windows NT account name lUSRjnachinename on the Server.
When enabled, IIS will first try to access requested pages as the Anonymous User by
checking the file ACLs to see if it allows Anonymous User privileges. The file is only
sent if the Anonymous User has sufficient privileges. The account is assigned as a
member of the Guests Group with the ability to "Log On Locally." Access privileges are
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checked for every file requested, not just the first file. Also, the user being authenticated
anonymously does not have access to the password used in anonymous authentication.
[Ref. 16]
IIS uses the NT security services for challenge/response authorization to
access files if IUSR account permission is not granted. If the Web browser supports NT
Challenge/Response, it will pass the user credentials to IIS. This provides authentication
between the browser and the server without passwords being transmitted over the
network. NT Challenge/Response requires a live connection between the Web client and
the server requiring authentication. This is accomplished through a TCP/IP socket and
will fail if the socket is lost or closed. IfNT Challenge/Response fails, the Web browser
requests Basic Authentication to pass user information to IIS. Basic authentication
without SSL support will pass user information in the clear over the network and may
allow the system to be compromised. [Ref. 1 6]
Web documents are retrieved from the Web server by the following
process:
• The Web browser sends an HTTP Get Request to the Web server.
• The Web server evaluates the HTTP Get request and locates the document in
question.
• The Web server attempts to open the document and finds that the file is
restricted to certain users.
• The Web server then sends back an HTTP Response with the status 401
Unauthorized Access Denied. In the header, the Web server will indicate
which means of authentication it accepts. The browser determines which
method to use for authentication.
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• If Basic authentication is being used, the user will then be prompted with a
logon dialog box requesting user name and password. If NT
Challenge/Response is in use the authentication will be performed without
user interaction.
• The Web server uses this information to attempt to gain access to the
requested file. If the user information provided has sufficient privileges, the
Web server will continue to send the Web document from step 3. [Ref. 16]
Digital certificates can be issued by Microsoft® Certificate Server, which
can be mapped to Windows NT user accounts to be used for authentication. IIS also
allows for enhanced security based on IP addresses. IP security allows administrators to
grant or deny access to an Internet service based on a TCP/IP address or group of
addresses. [Ref. 14]
Figure 4.2 illustrates the flow of requests to the server.
c. Audit Logging Capabilities
IIS incorporates extensive logging capabilities. Log files can be
automatically rotated based on the size of the log or by a specified time limit such as
daily, weekly, or monthly. Information regarding services can be logged directly to an
open database connectivity (ODBC) data source such as Microsoft SQL Server. It is
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Figure 4.2 File Access Flowchart [Ref. 16]
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C. MICROSOFT FRONTPAGE 98
Microsoft® FrontPage 98 is a member of the Microsoft Office family of products,
allowing it to integrate easily with NT Server and IIS 4.0. It is touted as the web creation
and management tool that requires no programming knowledge but is robust enough for
experienced Web site developers. FrontPage can be used to create, edit, and administer
web sites to be published by a WWW server. A FrontPage web is a collection of HTML
pages, images, documents, and other files and folders that make up a Web site. The main
components that will be examined in this chapter include the FrontPage Explorer for
managing the web site(s), the FrontPage Editor for creating and editing individual web
pages, and the FrontPage Server Extensions.
1. FrontPage Explorer
The FrontPage Explorer is the primary component of the FrontPage application.
The Explorer provides the graphical interface to create the layout of a web site. This
includes the capabilities to apply a preset graphical theme to the site, organize files and
folders, import and export files, test and repair hyperlinks, administer access privileges,
track tasks, and launch the FrontPage Editor to design and edit the contents of individual
web pages.
a. Administration
FrontPage offers three types of permissions to restrict web pages:
browsing, authoring, and administering permissions. Browsing permission allows a user,
group of users, or specific workstations to view the specific web from the World Wide
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Web. Authoring permission allows a user, group of users, or specific workstations to
open the web in FrontPage Explorer and edit pages and files. Administering permission
allows a user, group of users, or specific workstations to set permissions for the current
web, other users, and computer workstations. All permissions assigned in FrontPage are
hierarchical. This means that users with administrative privileges also have authoring
and browsing capabilities or a user with authoring permission also has browsing
permission. Also, all the FrontPage webs on the web server inherit their initial
permissions from the root web by default but can be changed as necessary. The
privileges are enforced via the FrontPage Server Extensions discussed later in this
chapter.
When permissions are set for a web, the Web server requests a name and
password for any task requiring permissions. Some Web servers will authenticate names
and passwords by prompting the user or by other means.
b. Views
The Views bar is located at the left of the screen in FrontPage Explorer.
Seven buttons provide different ways of looking at information contained in a FrontPage
web. The Folders view displays the content of the web arranged by folders and files. In
this view, folders and files may be created, deleted, moved, or copied. Figure 4.3
provides an example of the Folders View.
The All Files view displays all the files in a FrontPage web in a list
providing information such as the file names, sizes, types, and modification dates.
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aP FrontPage Explorer - <Root Web> (http://pcgkl4)
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Figure 4.3 FrontPage Explorer Folders View [Ref. 17]
The Navigation view consists of a split-screen display that shows the top-
level structure of the FrontPage web in the upper half of the screen and a file and folder
list in the lower half of the screen similar to Windows Explorer.
The Hyperlinks view graphically displays hyperlinks to pages and from
pages, other files in a FrontPage web, and all hyperlinks from the FrontPage web to other
sites on the World Wide Web. The Hyperlink command can be used to create or modify
a hyperlink in an existing web. A hyperlink can be created to any page or resource in the
current FrontPage web, on a local intranet, or the World Wide Web. If FrontPage
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Explorer is used to rename or move a file in the FrontPage web, all hyperlink references
to that file are automatically updated within the web, including hyperlinks from Microsoft
Office 97 documents. Broken hyperlinks—including hyperlinks to external World Wide
Web sites—can also be verified and repaired. Figure 4.4 indicates the structure of the
root web hyperlinks.
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Figure 4.4 FrontPage Explorer Hyperlinks View [Ref. 17]
The Hyperlink Status view identifies the status of the hyperlinks in a
FrontPage web. The list includes both internal and external hyperlinks and graphically
indicates whether the hyperlinks have been verified or whether they are broken.
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The Themes view can be used to apply a set of professionally designed
graphics to a FrontPage web. A theme consists of design elements for bullets, fonts,
images, navigation bars, and other page elements. When applied, a theme gives the pages
and navigation bars in a FrontPage web an attractive and consistent appearance.
The Tasks view in the FrontPage Explorer can track and complete any
unfinished FrontPage web tasks, such as spell-checking corrections, on all pages.
Clicking a task will automatically redirect the user to the page that needs work. Some
tasks are generated automatically during creation and maintenance of a FrontPage web.
Other tasks can be added and assigned to other FrontPage authors.
2. FrontPage Editor
While page creation and file management tasks are best handled in the FrontPage
Explorer, designing and editing pages is done in the FrontPage Editor. The FrontPage
Editor offers an interface similar to a word processor for ease of use. No Hypertext
Markup Language (HTML) is required; the FrontPage Editor generates the HTML code
from the author's inputs or can convert files from Microsoft Word, Excel, and
WordPerfect to HTML. All text, styles, and page formatting are based on Hypertext
Markup Language (HTML) standards. Inputs are displayed as they will appear when
viewed by a browser. The editor offers many page formats to create HTML pages with
the assistance of wizards and templates or allows users to create new templates. The
HTML view will also allow an author to edit HTML tags or script code directly.
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The editor provides the ability to create and test hyperlinks using a point-and-
click interface. Images can be inserted and converted to GIF or JPEG format. Image
maps can be created and edited to include hotspots—areas in the image containing
hyperlinks. FrontPage image-editing commands allow images to be rotated, cropped,
resized, and apply custom enhancements.
3. FrontPage Server Extensions
FrontPage includes a set of programs, called the FrontPage Server Extensions,
which are installed on the computer acting as the Web server. The Server Extensions
support authoring and administering FrontPage webs. Authoring can include copying or
publishing a FrontPage web to other Web servers, creating a table of contents for the
web, adding themes and navigational structure to a web, and updating hyperlinks to any
pages that have been moved or renamed. Using the Server Extensions, an administrator
can assign permissions for a user, group of users, or a specific computer to browse, edit,
or administer a FrontPage web. The Server Extensions support browse-time web
functionality such as search forms, discussion groups, form processing (including sending
form results using e-mail), and other run-time features. [Ref. 1 8]
The FrontPage client and server extensions are designed to minimize file transfers
over the Internet. An author using FrontPage Explorer on a client machine opens a web
from the Web server containing the server extensions. Information about the web, such
as the hyperlink map, is downloaded to the client machine. The pages and files contained
in the web are only downloaded from the Web server when it is opened for editing.
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Figure 4.5 shows the FrontPage Server Administrator interface used to administer
server extensions on a web.
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UninstaB FrontPage Server
Extensions for selected port




Check configuration of FrontPage
Server Extensions for selected port,
and fix problems encountered
Enable or disable authoring on
selected port
Add user name and password to
list of administrators.
Figure 4.5 FrontPage Server Administrator
The server extensions are designed to work with any standard Web server using
the Common Gateway Interface (CGI). Server extensions are developed to be easily
portable to popular hardware and software platforms for cross-platform Web server
capability. Some FrontPage web features that require server extensions include the full
hyperlink map, full-text index of all web pages in the web, a persistent structure defining
key pages and resulting relationships between those pages in the FrontPage web, web
themes, Tasks list and web-unique security settings. The root web and all sub-webs will
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have separate copies of the server extensions installed to enforce end-user, author, and
administrator privileges on each web.
The FrontPage client system tools communicate with the server extensions using
HTTP. Figure 4.5 displays the interaction between the client system and the server. The
client utilizes the Web Extender Client (WEC) library communicating via Winsock and
TCP/IP.
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Figure 4.6 FrontPage Server and Client Extensions [Ref. 18]
Each FrontPage web contains copies of the server extensions consisting of three
ISAPI DLLs. The DLLs are created in directories below the top-level directory of each
web:
_vti_bin/_vti_adm/admin.dll for administrative tasks,
_vti_bin/_vti_aut/author.dll for authoring FrontPage webs
_vti_bin/shtml.dll for browse-time components such as form handlers
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All authoring and administrative tasks are performed by sending HTTP POST
requests to these DLLs.
Web security is performed on IIS by changing the ACLs for all files and
directories in each FrontPage web. The ACL on admin.dll controls who may administer
the web. Authoring and browsing permissions are set on author.dll and shtml.dll ACLs,
respectively. ACLs for a web are set using the FrontPage Explorer's Permissions
command on the Tools menu. As a security measure in Windows NT, a DLL that is
called from another DLL must run under the same user account as the calling DLL.
Therefore, all system DLL code running due to an IIS request must run in accordance
with the user permissions. Since the FrontPage DLLs contain calls to Windows NT
system DLLs, FrontPage adds the Interactive and Network accounts to the ACLs of
system DLLs called to ensure the correct level of permissions to run under an
administrator, author, or user account. The new accounts are provided "read" and
"execute" permissions on the system DLLs.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Both Internet Information Server 4.0 and FrontPage 98 are essential to presenting
this project on the Internet. The integration with Windows NT 4.0 enables the ability to
control access to select components of the web site. This chapter has detailed the role of
each of these products from the behind-the-scenes nature of IIS to the content





This chapter examines the creation, distribution, and use of digital certificates for
identification and authentication of servers and clients. In order to control access to
specific web pages, this project identifies users using digital certificates.
First, a description of digital certificates in general is presented. Then, two
alternatives are presented for implementing access control by issuing certificates to web
site users with either Microsoft® Certificate Server or VeriSign™ OnSite.
B. DIGITAL CERTIFICATES DEFINED
Controlling access to resources, whether files or Internet web pages, requires
some form of identifying the potential user. Conventional means of identifying users
usually involves assigning user accounts with associated passwords.
Passwords may be compromised by transmission over an insecure network,
disclosure by the individual, or may be easy to crack by brute force guessing. A strong
password policy will correct some deficiencies, but cannot prevent the password from
being collected during transmission in the clear over an insecure connection to the server
or being disclosed on a note posted near an employee workstation.
A digital certificate can not only provide a fast and efficient means of user
identification, but also can save a user from remembering many cumbersome passwords
to access different applications on the same server. Certificates are based on public key
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cryptography, where a public key is used to encrypt messages that can only be decrypted
using the corresponding private key. Because private keys cannot be derived from their
corresponding public keys, public keys can be made widely available with no risk to
security.
The certificate is basically a document, signed by a trusted certificate authority
(CA), which matches public keys to other information such as a name. The CA is a
trusted third party that acts almost like a notary public to verify the match between the
public keys and the identity of the user, e-mail address, or other information. In order to
communicate securely using certificates, the entities must trust the same CA. Certificates
signed by that CA are exchanged so the parties involved learn each other's public keys to
encrypt and exchange data and verify signatures.
To verify a certificate, the public key of the CA is required and possibly a check
against the revocation list. Certificates have a limited life due to changes in the
algorithms and protocols and potential compromise of private keys. A certificate is
requested, created, and expires or is revoked if compromised. The strength of certificate
security depends on the choice and implementation of policy chosen by the CA, the
digital algorithms used, the revocation policy used, and the availability and use of
certificate revocation lists (CRLs).
1. Security Principles
Certificates enable subscribers to benefit from the following security principles:
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a. Identification
Identification offers assurance that senders of digitally signed messages
and Web sites are, in fact, who they say they are.
b. Authenticity
Authentication verifies that another party has not altered the message; also
called data integrity.
c. Nonrepudiation
Nonrepudiation is the ability for the sender of a signed message to claim
that he or she did not send the message, or that he or she sent a different message.
a\ Verification
Verification applies to both identification and authentication of a signed
message.
e. Privacy
Privacy provides assurance that no one but the recipient can view an
encrypted message.
2. Certificate Creation
According to "The Core Technology: Public-Key Cryptography" [Ref. 19], there
are six steps to certificate creation.
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a. Key Generation
The applicant for a certificate generates a public and a private key.
b. Matching ofPolicy Information
The applicant packages the additional information necessary for the CA to
issue the certificate. The precise definition of the information requested is at the
discretion of the CA, but typically includes proof of identity , e-mail address, etc.
c. Sending the Public Keys and Information
The applicant sends the public keys and requested information to the CA,
typically encrypted with the CA's public key.
d. Verification ofInformation
The CA applies its policy governing the verification of the applicant
information to determine whether or not to issue a certificate.
e. Certificate Creation
The CA creates a digital document with the appropriate information
—
public keys, expiration date, etc.—and signs it with the CA's private key.
/ Sending/Posting of Certificate




X.509, or The Directory: Authentication Framework, is an International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) recommendation for authentication of directory users in
an Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) system. X.509 has formed the basis for most
certification schemes used on the Internet. X.509 describes two levels of authentication.
These levels are simple authentication—based on usage of a password to verify user
identity—and strong authentication, using credentials formed using cryptographic
techniques. The standard recommends that only strong authentication be used as the
basis of providing secure services.
User certificates may be held within a Directory and may be freely communicated
within the system and obtained by users in the same way as other information. X.509
defines a standard structure for certificates that allows for the specification of version and
serial numbers, digital signatures, issuer and validity details, subject name and unique
identifiers for the issuer and the subject. A method for generating lists of revoked
certificates is also defined. The standard allows for one, two and three way
authentication. An example of one-way authentication is a client providing identification
to a server. Two-way authentication may involve both user and server authentication.
Three-way authentication involves a trusted third party to authenticate both the client and
the server.
Public-key cryptography is used for strong authentication, but the authentication
framework is not dependent on the use of a particular cryptographic algorithm. However,
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two users wishing to authenticate must support the same algorithm. The RSA
cryptosystem is defined in Annex C of the X.509 standard. Draft amendment 1 to the
standard provides additional attributes that can be used to define key identifiers, key
policy information, alternative subject or issuer names and certification path constraints.
4. PKCS
Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) govern the are use of public and
private digital keys to protect data. PKCS has been developed by RSA Laboratories in
cooperation with an informal consortium, originally including Apple, Microsoft, DEC,
Lotus, Sun and MIT. The standards have been widely adopted for the specification of
security systems based on public and private keys.
PKCS includes both cryptographic algorithm-specific and algorithm-independent
implementation standards. Algorithms supported include RSA and Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, among others. However, only RSA and Diffie-Hellman are specifically
detailed.
PKCS also defines an algorithm-independent syntax for digital signatures, digital
envelopes for encryption and extended certificates that enable someone implementing any
cryptographic algorithm whatsoever to conform to a standard syntax, and thus achieve
interoperability.
To date the following specifications have been published:
• PKCS #1, which defines mechanisms for encrypting and signing data using
the RSA public-key cryptosystem.
• PKCS #3, which defines a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol.
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• PKCS #5, which describes a method for encrypting a string with a secret key
derived from a password.
• PKCS #6, which describes a format for extended certificates. An extended
certificate consists of an X.509 certificate together with a set of attributes
signed by the issuer of the certificate. (PKCS #6 is being phased out in favor
ofVersion3ofX.509.)
• PKCS #7, which defines a general syntax for messages that include
cryptographic enhancements such as digital signatures and encryption.
• PKCS #8, which describes a format for private-key information. This
information includes a private key for some public-key algorithm, and
optionally a set of attributes.
• PKCS #9, which defines selected attribute types for use in the other PKCS
standards.
• PKCS #10, which describes syntax for certification requests.
• - PKCS #11, which defines a technology-independent programming interface,
called Cryptoki, for cryptographic devices such as smart cards and PCMCIA
cards.
• PKCS #12, which defines a Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
• PKCS #13, which defines an Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standard.
The specifications used during the course of this project include PKCS #7 and
#10.
C. MICROSOFT CERTIFICATE SERVER
Microsoft® Certificate Server 1.0 is a development platform for building
Certificate Authorities for enterprises or secure Internet applications. Certificate Server
provides customizable services for issuing and managing certificates used in software
security systems employing public-key cryptography. A configured and operational CA
will allow a site to issue, track, manage, and revoke certificates with minimal
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administration overhead. Programmable interfaces are included for developers to create
support for additional transports, policies, and certificate properties and formats.
Microsoft Certificate Server must be installed with Microsoft Internet Information
Server 4.0 on a server with Windows® NT Server 4.0 with Service Pack 3 installed.
Microsoft Internet Explorer version 3.0 or above is required for Web-based certificate
enrollment. When installing the certificate server software, a root certificate for the
server as a Certificate Authority (CA) will be created. If the "Non-Root CA" option is
selected, a certificate request file will be created in order to obtain a certificate from
another CA, such as VeriSign™. The Certificate Authority service is configured to start
automatically under the System Account when the operating system loads.
Microsoft Certificate Server uses a network share known as the Shared Folder to
store the Certificate Server configuration file, CA signature and key exchange certificates,
and CA Certificate List Web page. The Shared Folder must be a publicly accessible
network share so that any user can access and install the CA certificates using the
Certificate Authority Certificate List Web page.
1. Certificate Server Architecture
The Certificate Server consists of a Server Engine, the Server Database, and a set
of modules and tools that work together to function as a CA. An operational certification
system is composed of four major subsystems: client, intermediary, server, and
administrative client. The Figure 5.1 illustrates the relationship between subsystems.
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a. Client
The client is the software that is used by the end user to generate a
certificate request, send the request, and receive the finished certificate. The client will
usually interact with a custom interface maintained by the intermediary application. An


































Figure 5.1 Relationships Between Certificate Server Subsystems [Ref. 20]
b. Intermediary
An intermediary subsystem contains the intermediary application and the
Certificate Server Client Interface. This application interacts directly with the client,
receiving certificate requests and returning finished certificates. It communicates with
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the Server Engine through the Certificate Server Client Interface. An example of an
intermediary application is Microsoft Internet Information Server.
c. Server
The server is the system that builds the certificate. In addition to the
Server Engine, two configurable components are included: the policy module and the exit
module.
d. Administrative Client
The administrative client is the system that monitors and manages
certificates and requests.
2. Handling Certificate Requests
Certificate Server processes a certificate request in the following manner.
a. Request Reception
The certificate request is received by an intermediary application, which
formats it into a PKCS #10 format request and submits it to the Server Engine.
b. Request Approval
The Server Engine calls the Policy Module, which queries request




If the request is approved, the Server Engine takes the request, and any
properties requested by the Policy Module, and builds a complete certificate. The
certificate will include the certificate version and serial numbers, digital signature, issuer
and validity details, subject name and unique identifiers for the issuer and the subject.
d. Certificate Publication
The completed certificate is then published to a directory service, or given
back to the user. By default, the server notifies each exit module installed on the server
whenever a certificate is published.
3. Administration
In order to process certificate requests, administer the Certificate Server, and
create reports, administrators can access the Certificate Server Web page—depicted in
Figure 5.2—containing links to the Certificate Administration Log Utility, the Certificate
Administration Queue Utility, Certificate Enrollment Tools, and Certificate Server
Documentation. All administrative functions are web-based for ease of use and
consistency. However, many functions can also be activated from the command prompt.
The Certificate Enrollment Tools page allows administrators to process
certificates requests. The Tools page also permits users to request certificates from the
"Request a Client Authentication Certificate" option, obtain, and install a CA certificate
in their Web browser from the link to the Certificate Authority (CA) Certificate List Web
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page. The Enrollment Tools page will need to be publicly accessible in order to allow
new users to submit requests. The Enrollment Tools page is shown in Figure 5.3. The
URL to access the Tools page for this system is
[http://pcgkl4.ece.nps.navy.mil/CertSrv/CertEnroll/default.htm].
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Figure 5.2 Certificate Server Web Page [Ref. 21]
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3 Certificate Enrollment Tools - Microsoft Internet Explorer
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Figure 5.3 Certificate Enrollment Tools Page [Ref. 21]
D. VERISIGN ONSITE
Due to the additional software, database and memory requirements to implement a
local certificate server, Microsoft Certificate Server may not be a feasible solution for
every system. A trusted third party may be considered to issue and store certificates. In
this case, VeriSign, Inc. was chosen as a third party due to a solid reputation as a
certificate authority. In addition, VeriSign offers an evaluation copy of the OnSite
service in order to test its compatibility with the system used for this project.
VeriSign, Inc. provides a service called OnSite to enable an entity to create, sign
and distribute digital certificates without needing to purchase expensive hardware or
obtain certificate server software. Individuals, organizations, and devices receiving
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certificates are called subscribers. OnSite enables the entity to approve applications for
digital certificates for use by individuals or organizations or to issue certificates that
identify devices or Web sites. OnSite uses Verisign's hardware, software, and secure
processes and facilities to issue and manage certificates for subscribers. Designated
OnSite Certificate Administrators—usually administrators for the web server—approve
or reject certificate applications, while a VeriSign CA actually issues the certificates to
subscribers from VeriSign's secure facility. Using issued certificates, subscribers can
engage in secure electronic communications with the entity server over the Internet.
OnSite End User Certificates support the Secure/MIME (S/MIME) secure email
standard. Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) is the official proposed
standard for Internet electronic mail. S/MIME is a protocol that adds the digital signature
and encryption capabilities of the PKCS to MIME. OnSite Secure Server Certificates are
issued as part of a PCKS #7 chain, and may be used to implement Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL).
This project utilized an evaluation edition of OnSite in order to test its application
to control access to the web site.
1. Onsite Full Setup
A complete version of OnSite supported by VeriSign includes:
• Smartcard and smartcard reader to store the administrative certificate (not
included for evaluation copy)
• Configuration wizards to start the service and guide administrators
66
• Customizable Digital ID extensions that allow inclusion of company name or
other information
• Web-based end-user enrollment
• Directory files automatically formatted to support standard-based directories
2. Certificate Application Process
Each applicant takes the following steps to request a certificate from OnSite for
access to this web site.
a. Step 1
An applicant for a certificate submits a Web based certificate enrollment
form, which includes personal information along with their public key from the URL:
[https://testdrive.verisign.com/NavalPostgraduateSchoolCode37/userEnrollNS.htm]. The
contents of this enrollment form are encrypted using a medium-grade encryption key
(RC4-Export, 128 bit with 40 secret) and securely transferred to OnSite along with the
user's public key. OnSite logs the request for Certificate Administrator consideration.
b. Step 2
The OnSite Certificate Administrator uses the smart card to gain secure
access to the OnSite Control Center Web site. In the Control Center, the administrator
reviews the contents of the certificate application. Using a well-defined process, the
administrator can validate the identity and affiliation of the applicant entity.
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c. Step 3
If the administrator is able to confirm the information in the enrollment
form, the administrator can approve the certificate application. When the administrator
indicates approval, OnSite submits a request to the appropriate VeriSign Certification
Authority to issue a certificate to the applicant. This request to the CA is digitally signed
using the administrator's private key.
d. Step 4
VeriSign's CA creates and signs the certificate. By default, OnSite sends
the applicant email notification of certificate approval. The email includes a personal
identification number (PIN) and the URL at which the applicant can claim his or her
certificate. The default email message is sent to the address provided on the enrollment
form and is not encrypted. Administrators can use OnSite 's Authentication Wizard to
change the method by which the PIN is provided to the end user. The default email
message may be used, the message may be sent to a third party to inform the applicant, or
a no message option may be selected. If an approval message is not sent, the
administrator may notify the applicant personally to receive a PIN by other means.
e. Step 5
Using the PIN, the applicant picks up the certificate. When the applicant




The OnSite Control Center Web pages can be accessed to monitor and manage the
lifecycle of issued certificates. Only the OnSite Certificate Administrators are allowed
access to the certificates stored at the OnSite Control Center through the public-private
key pair and the VeriSign-provided Certificate Administrator certificate that are secured
on the included smart card. OnSite enables issuing and administering Private Label End
User Certificates, Public Label Secure Server Certificates, and Public Label End User
Certificates. A view of the Control Center is provided in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4 VeriSign OnSite Control Center [Ref. 22]
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Administrators are given the option to process requests, view requests, view
certificates, revoke certificates, download the certificate revocation list (CRL), configure
user services such as enrollment and self-revocation of certificates, generate reports, and
import certificate directory data files to the local server.
4. Subscribers
After the Certification Authority has issued a certificate, the applicant picks it up
using a Web browser or email and installs it in his or her computer. Secure Server
Certificates that are issued are installed on the Web server. The user now has a private
key in a separate file to which only that subscriber has access, and a public certificate that
includes his or her public key and the signature of the issuing CA. The subscriber's
public key is made available in the certificate to anyone who wants to correspond with
him or her. In the certificate, the public key is bound to a subscriber's name or to a site's
fully qualified domain name and to other identifying information requested by the CA.
Privacy of the private key is critical to the proper use of certificates. Therefore, it
is essential to convey to subscribers their responsibility for protecting his, her, or its
private key(s) from compromise, loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use.
Protection may include passwords to protect the certificates kept by the browser a
restricted access to stored files, such as keys, in system file storage.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
With the increasing use of electronic communication, it is only appropriate that
users are no longer required to provide a password that can be easily compromised and
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instead are identified by a digital signature. The X.509 standard is widely utilized for
digital certificates and is supported by almost all web browsers. In order to control access
to files, directories, and web sites, the certificates eliminate the need for multiple
passwords and allow a user's certificate to be mapped to a local account on the Windows
NT server. Two options are presented for a site to issue certificates. Microsoft
Certificate Server allows the issuance and administration of certificates from the system
to be accessed. VeriSign offers the OnSite service to customers who wish to issue and
administer certificates without the acquisition of additional software and hardware





This chapter details the specifications of the hardware used for this project.
B. SERVER SETUP
The workstation selected as the project server would be required to be IT-21
compliant in order to achieve the goal of this project. The server would not only need to
be the Windows NT domain controller, but also perform the duties of the Web server and
certificate server. The server selected for this project is a Dell Dimension XPS R400
personal computer. Table 6.1 lists the hardware specifications of the server.
Component Specification
Processor 400 MHz Pentium II MMX CPU
Memory 320 MB SDRAM
Data torage/disk drives 8.0 GB Hard Disk Drive
3.5 inch Floppy Disk Drive
24X IDE CD-ROM
Iomega Zip 1 00 drive
Video/Sound Diamond 8 MB RAM AGP Video Card
Soundblaster (Compatible) Audio Card with
speakers
NIC 3COM Fast Etherlink XL PCI
SCSI Adapter Adaptec AHA-2940Ultra Wide
Additional 17 inch Monitor (1280 x 1024)
Microsoft Mouse
Dell QuietKey Keyboard
Table 6.1 Server Specifications
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C. CAMERA
The original goal of the project involved incorporating HTML commands into the
web pages that would control a remote system. The "system" selected involves the use of
a camera to provide an interactive visual response to commands.
This system uses a Sony DKC-ID1 Pro digital still camera. The camera is
connected to the computer by a SCSI cable with a 50 pin connection. The camera
package includes a TWAIN software module to interface with the computer and
communicate with TWAIN32 compatible software to transfer pictures from the camera to
the computer. In order for communication between the camera and computer, the
ASPI32 manager (wnaspi32.dll) and the SCSI host adapter device driver
(sparrow.mpd/ahal54x.mpd/aic78xx.mpd) must be installed in the System folder of the
Windows directory.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. THESIS SUMMARY
This thesis explores the concept of implementing IT-2 standards to limit access to
a World Wide Web site. The introduction of IT-2 1 has focused acquisition to primarily
Microsoft products to improve interoperability, hence the operating system and
applications used for this project.
Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0 provides the foundation for this task. Chapter
III provides and in-depth look at the operating system and the adjustments needed to
attain as close to C2 configuration requirements as possible. As long as the system is
connected to a network, complete C2 compliance will not be possible. The security
measures inherent to NT Server 4.0 are essential to the success of this project.
The software used—Microsoft Internet Information Server 4.0 and FrontPage
98—were chosen for the features each provides, in addition to the ability to integrate with
NT Server security measures. Many products offer Internet publishing, but the focus for
any DOD system needs to be access control. The solution presented offers a means for
allowing any user to browse portions of the site, while restricting access to certain pages.
Access control is accomplished through the use of certificates issued by the Microsoft
Certificate server or by outside means such as Verisign's OnSite services. Certificates
can be used by the server to identify users, and Windows NT offers the ability to map
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certificates to a user account on the server to assign access permissions down to the file
level.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
This project can proceed in many areas of future research. Areas originally
considered include controlling the functions of the camera itself. This could include
focus, zoom, and even controlling movements of the camera. The system is not limited
to just a camera as a remote system. The camera interface was chosen for the remote
system as a means of visually monitoring changes. The system can be modified for
controlling access to specific functions on a web page, not just limiting access to whole
pages.
Ideally, this system could be developed to control access to classified and
unclassified information on the same site. At this time, the focus has been on limiting
access to strictly unclassified information due to the incomplete C2 rating of Windows
NT Server 4.0.
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APPENDIX A. REGISTRY PERMISSION CHANGES
This appendix contains the following files explaining the contents of the
recommended C2regacl.inf and C2ntfacl.inf files to be used with Microsoft's C2
Configuration Manager. The registry changes are made when the "Registry Security"
option is activated. The file and permission changes are implemented by activating the
"File System Security" option.
In the case that C2 Configuration Manager is not operable, the registry and file




Modified C2regacl.inf file by
NSA Windows NT Integration Team
01 DEC 97
Registry ACL definition file
Use this file to set the registry key ACL ' s to the
desired security. The format of each entry is:
[RegistryKey]
Domain\Account = [INHERIT,] access [, access]...
where
:
RegistryKey is the key path of the key to set. This
is in the format of:
PREDEFINED_KEY\ [path | *]
where
:





and path is the path to the key. The path may end
in a "*" character in which case, all sub-keys of




would assign the security description of
that section to all keys UNDER the
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE \Microsoft
key but NOT to the
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE \Microsoft
key itself. To assign security to that key,






specifies the account to recieve the specified
access for that key. Account may be an account or a
group. For Example to give permissions to all
administrator accounts, the:
BUILTIN\Administrators
would be the correct entry.
access is defined as one of the following:
QV = Query Value
SV = Set Value
CS = Create Subkey
ES = Enumerate Subkeys
NT = Notify
CL = Create Link
DE = Delete
RC = Read Control
WD = Write DAC
WO = Write Owner
there are also some predefined combination access keys:
NONE = no access
FULL = QV, SV, CS, ES, NT, CL, DE, WD, WO, RC
READ = QV, ES, NT, RC
The 'INHERIT' string can be specified (in the first
entry only) to indicate this is the access control to










Authenticated Users = Read
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\*]
BUILTIN\Administrators = FULL
BUILTIN\Administrators = INHERIT, FULL
SYSTEM = FULL
SYSTEM = INHERIT, FULL
Authenticated Users = Read
Authenticated Users = INHERIT, Read
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Description]
BUILTIN\Administrators = FULL
BUILTIN\Administrators = INHERIT, FULL
SYSTEM = FULL
SYSTEM = INHERIT, FULL
CREATOR OWNER = FULL
CREATOR OWNER = INHERIT, FULL
Authenticated Users = QV, SV, CS, ES, NT, DE, RC
Authenticated Users = INHERIT, QV, SV, CS, ES, NT, DE, RC
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Description\*]
BUILTIN\Administrators = FULL
BUILTINXAdministrators = INHERIT, FULL
SYSTEM = FULL
SYSTEM = INHERIT, FULL
CREATOR OWNER = FULL
CREATOR OWNER = INHERIT, FULL
Authenticated Users = QV, SV, CS, ES, NT, DE, RC




CREATOR OWNER = FULL
Authenticated Users - QV, SV, CS, ES, NT, DE, RC
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\*]
BUILTIN\Administrators = FULL
BUILTINXAdministrators = INHERIT, FULL
SYSTEM = FULL
SYSTEM = INHERIT, FULL
CREATOR OWNER = FULL
CREATOR OWNER = INHERIT, FULL
Authenticated Users = QV, SV, CS, ES, NT, DE, RC




CREATOR OWNER = FULL
SYSTEM = FULL
BUILTIN\Power Users = QV, SV, CS, ES, NT, DE, RC
Authenticated Users = READ
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Secure]
BUILTIN\Administrators = FULL
CREATOR OWNER = FULL
SYSTEM = FULL
Authenticated Users = READ
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Windows 3.1 Migration Status
BUILTIN\Administrators = FULL
BUILTIN\Administrators = INHERIT, FULL
CREATOR OWNER = FULL
CREATOR OWNER = INHERIT, FULL
SYSTEM - FULL
SYSTEM" = INHERIT, FULL
Authenticated Users = READ



















Authenticated Users = Read
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[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft Windows
NT \Cur rentVer s i on \ Drivers]
BUILTIN\Administrators = FULL
SYSTEM = FULL




















Authenticated Users = Read
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft Windows
NT \CurrentVers ion \ Fonts]
BUILTINXAdministrators = FULL
SYSTEM = FULL
Authenticated Users = Read
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft Windows
NT\CurrentVer si on \ FontSubstitutes]
BUILTINXAdministrators - FULL
SYSTEM = FULL








































































Authenticated Users = Read
C2NTFACL.INF
Modified C2ntfacl.inf file by
NSA Windows NT Integration Team
01 DEC 97
File System ACL definition file
Use this file to set the ACL's on files and directories
to the desired
security. The format of each entry is:
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[DirPath]










FilePath is the path of the file or directory to set.
This is in the format of a file path name. The file
path may contain environment variables (such as
%systemroot%) which will be expanded on the system
running tha application.
The last item in the FilePath string may be a
directory, file, wildcard file or an exclamation
("!"). In the case of an exclamation all files and






would assign the security description of
that section to all files and sub-
directories UNDER the %systemroot\system32
directory as well as to the
%systemroot\system32 directory itself. To
assign security to just the files in that




specifies the account to recieve the specified
access for that file. Account may be an account or




would be the correct entry,
access string is defined as one of the following
a combination of access chars
access
char File Access Dir Access
R = Read Data
W = Write Data
X = Execute File
D = Delete
P = Change Perms
= Take Ownership







there are also some predefined combination access keys
NONE = no access
ALL - RWXDPO



















-k'k'k^krkic'k'k-k NOTE * * **************
For correct application of the access control, the more
restrictive access entries must be placed ahead of (on
top of) the more permissive access. The correct "sort"
order would be:
NoAccess, List, Add, Read, AddRead, Change,
FullControl
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NOTE: the security items are applied from the top of
the file to the bottom. Because of that, top level
directory entries with more restrictive security should
be at the top of the file and less restrictive entries
to specific users and/or specific files should be
listed next.
[%SystemDrive%\]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
[%SystemDrive%\*. *]





















[ %SystemDrive% \AUTOEXEC . BAT
]










Authenticated Users = add
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl








Authenticated Users = RWX





Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
SERVER OPERATOR = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\!
]
Authenticated Users = List
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\Conf ig\ !
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM - FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
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[%SystemRoot%\Cursors\ ! ]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\Fonts\ ! ]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl




Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl




Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl




Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl '
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\Pif \
!
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl




Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINYAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl




Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
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Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\ Profiles]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\*.*]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\*.INI]

























Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
BUILTIN\Power Users = change
[%SystemRoot%\PRINTMAN.HLP]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl







Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
SERVER OPERATOR = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\SYSTEM32]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\SYSTEM32\*. *]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
SERVER OPERATOR = FullControl
[%SystemRoot% \SYSTEM32\rdisk.exe]
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl






































Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
BUILTIN\Power Users = change








CREATOR OWNER = FullControl







Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
BUILTIN\Power Users = change







Authenticated Users = List
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl




Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl




Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl









CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
BUILTIN\Power Users = change
SERVER OPERATORS = FullControl










Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM - FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemDrive%\Program FilesX!]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTIN\Administrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl
CREATOR OWNER = FullControl
[%SystemRoot%\ShellNew\* . *]
Authenticated Users = Read
BUILTINXAdministrators = FullControl
SYSTEM = FullControl































APPENDIX B. USER RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS
The table on the following pages defines the user rights for Windows NT Server
and includes a compilation of the recommendations for configuration from the Guide to
Implementing Windows NT® in Secure Network Environments by the National Security
Agency [Ref. 5] and "Securing Microsoft Windows NT Installation" by the Microsoft®
Corporation [Ref. 7]. User rights are allowable actions which can be assigned to users or
groups in addition to the built-in abilities. Careful allocation of standard and advanced
user rights can significantly strengthen the security of an NT system.
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Standard/Advanced User Rights Recommendations
Policy
[Regular (R), Advanced (A)]
NTS Default Navy Configuration
for NT Servers
1. Access this computer from the
network (R): Allows a user to






2. Act as part of the operating
system (A): Allows a process to
perform as a secure, trusted part of
the operating system. Some
subsystems are granted this right.
(None) (None)
3. Add workstations to domain
(R): Allows users to added
workstations to a particular
domain. This right is meaningful
only on domain controllers.
(None) (None)
4. Back up files and directories
(R): Allows a user to back up
files and directories. This right








5. Bypass traverse checking (A):
Allows a user to change
directories and access files and
subdirectories even if the user has
no permission to access parent
directories.
Everyone (None)
6. Change the system time (R):
Allows a user to set the time for





7. Create a pagefile (A): Allows the
user to create new pagefiles for
virtual memory swapping.
Administrators Administrators
8. Create a token object (A):
Allows a process to create access
tokens. Only the Local Security




[Regular (R), Advanced (A)]
NTS Default Navy Configuration
for NT Servers
9. Create permanent shared
objects (A): Allows user to create
special permanent objects, such as
WDevice, that are used within
Windows NT.
(None) (None)
10. Debug programs (A): Allows a
user to debug various low-level
objects such as threads.
Administrators (None)
11. Force shut down from a remote
system (R): Allows the user to
shutdown a Windows NT system





12. Generate security audits (A):
Allows a process to generate
security audit log entries.
(None)
13. Increase quotas (A): Nothing.
This right has no effect in current
versions of Windows NT.
Administrators Administrators
14. Increase scheduling priority (A):
Allows a user to boost the
execution priority of a process.
Administrators Administrators
15. Load and unload device drivers
(R): Allows a user to install and
remove device drivers.
Administrators Administrators
16. Lock pages in memory (A):
Allows a user to lock pages in
memory so they cannot be paged
out to a backing store such as
Pagefile.sys.
(None) (None)
17. Log on as a batch job (A):
Nothing. This right has no effect





[Regular (R), Advanced (A)]
NTS Default Navy Configuration
for NT Servers
18. Log on as a service (A): Allows a
process to register with the system
as a service.
(None) (None)
19. Log on locally (R): Allows a user












20. Manage auditing and security
log (R): Allows a user to specify
what types of resource access
(such as file access) are to be
audited, and to view and clear the
security log. Note that this right
does not allow a user to set system
auditing policy using the Audit
command in the Policy menu of
User Manager. Also, members of
the administrators group always
have the ability to view and clear
the security log.
Administrators Administrators
21. Modify firmware environment
values (A): Allows a user to
modify system environment
variables stored in nonvolatile
RAM on systems that support this
type of configuration.
Administrators Administrators
22. Profile single process (A):
Allows a user to perform profiling
(performance sampling) on a
process.
Administrators Administrators
23. Profile system performance (A):
Allows a user to perform profiling





[Regular (R), Advanced (A)]
NTS Default Navy Configuration
for NT Servers
24. Replace a process level token
(A): Allows a user to modify a
process's security access token.
This is a powerful right used only
by the system.
(None) (None)
25. Restore files and directories (R):
Allows a user to restore backed-up
files and directories. This right








26. Shut down the system (R):












27. Take ownership of files or other
objects (R): Allows a user to take
ownership of files, directories,
printers, and other objects on the
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